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Collaborators: Wenzhuo Xu, Julie S. Downs
Overview
There has been a growing push in recent years to allow applicants to choose whether or not to submit information that could hurt their chances of success in competitive contexts. For example, many universities have implemented Test-Optional policies that allow applicants to omit their standardized test scores from their colleges applications. These kinds of policies create complicated, strategic decision environments in which Information Senders (e.g., college applicants) must decide whether or not to submit potentially harmful information and Information Receivers (e.g., admissions officers) must make inferences about missing information.
Economic theory would suggest that Information Receivers should automatically assume the worst about Information Senders who do not disclose information (i.e., they didn't submit a test score because their score was bad). Similarly, economic theory suggests that Information Senders should anticipate this reaction and submit any score that is not the worst possible value. But is this what really happens? Is everyone truly this strategic?
In this project, we seek to develop a psychologically-informed understanding of how Information Senders make disclosure decisions and how Information Receivers make inferences about applicants who omit information. We explore these phenomena within the context of test-optional college admissions and evaluate the role of individual differences in strategic reasoning. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:
Economic theory would suggest that Information Receivers should automatically assume the worst about Information Senders who do not disclose information (i.e., they didn't submit a test score because their score was bad). Similarly, economic theory suggests that Information Senders should anticipate this reaction and submit any score that is not the worst possible value. But is this what really happens? Is everyone truly this strategic?
In this project, we seek to develop a psychologically-informed understanding of how Information Senders make disclosure decisions and how Information Receivers make inferences about applicants who omit information. We explore these phenomena within the context of test-optional college admissions and evaluate the role of individual differences in strategic reasoning. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:
- Do Information Receivers assume that students who omit their standardized test scores have lower scores than they actually do?
- Do Information Receivers punish applicants who omit their standardized test scores by ranking/rating them lower than applicants who submit their scores?
- Are Information Receivers' inferences and punishment behaviors influenced by their beliefs about why applicants did not submit their standardized test scores (e.g., chose not to submit vs. could not afford to take the test).
- Do Information Senders correctly predict the extent to which they will be punished for omitting their scores?
- Are Information Senders' disclosure decisions or Information Receivers' inferences influenced by individual differences in strategic reasoning (i.e., k-level thinking)?
Presentations
Xu, W., Cash, T. N., & Downs, J. S. (2024, November). Development and validation of an individual-differences measure of k-level strategic anticipation [Poster Session]. Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, New York, NY.
Xu, W., Cash, T. N., & Downs, J. S. (2024, February). Validation of an individual-differences measure of k-Level strategic reasoning [Poster Session]. Annual Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, San Diego, CA.
Xu, W., Cash, T. N., & Downs, J. S. (2023, November). Strategic thinking in disclosing and unraveling of hidden information [Poster Session]. Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, San Francisco, CA.
Xu, W., Cash, T. N., & Downs, J. S. (2024, February). Validation of an individual-differences measure of k-Level strategic reasoning [Poster Session]. Annual Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, San Diego, CA.
Xu, W., Cash, T. N., & Downs, J. S. (2023, November). Strategic thinking in disclosing and unraveling of hidden information [Poster Session]. Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, San Francisco, CA.
Grants
August 2023: Lorraine D. Eyde Fund Grant, American Psychological Foundation, $3,350
June 2023: Graduate Student Small Research Grant, Center for Behavioral and Decision Research, $2,450
June 2023: Graduate Student Small Research Grant, Center for Behavioral and Decision Research, $2,450
