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Trent N. Cash, Daniel M. Oppenheimer
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APA
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Cash, T. N., & Oppenheimer, D. M. Isolating Sources of Metacognitive Knowledge in Multi-Attribute Choice.
Chicago/Turabian
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Cash, Trent N., and Daniel M. Oppenheimer. “Isolating Sources of Metacognitive Knowledge in Multi-Attribute Choice” (n.d.).
MLA
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Cash, Trent N., and Daniel M. Oppenheimer. Isolating Sources of Metacognitive Knowledge in Multi-Attribute Choice.
BibTeX Click to copy
@article{cash-a,
title = {Isolating Sources of Metacognitive Knowledge in Multi-Attribute Choice},
author = {Cash, Trent N. and Oppenheimer, Daniel M.}
}
Abstract
Psychologists have long been interested in exploring decision makers’ metacognitive
knowledge about how they make decisions. Extant theory suggests that metacognitive
judgments can be informed by privileged, internal metacognitive insights (e.g.,
mnemonic cues, introspection), as well as observable, external information (e.g.,
extrinsic cues, intrinsic cues) that can be evaluated via non-privileged mechanisms,
such as statistical monitoring and top-down knowledge. Across two studies, we explore
the extent to which decision makers’ metacognitive knowledge of how they make
decisions is reliant on each of these sources. In Study 1, we demonstrate that decision
makers (n = 221) can more accurately estimate the weights they applied to each
attribute in a multi-attribute choice task than observers (n = 220) who studied their
choices. This contrast highlights the metacognitive value of privileged metacognitive
insights. However, observers’ estimates were still somewhat correlated with decision
makers’ true attribute weights, suggesting that the combination of statistical monitoring
and top-down knowledge can lead to reasonably accurate inferences, even without
access to privileged metacognitive insights. In Study 2, we demonstrate that observers’
(n = 218) inferences are only slightly less accurate when the context of the decision is
obscured, suggesting that top-down knowledge is not necessary for observers.
Together, these results suggest that statistical monitoring alone can generate
reasonably accurate inferences about decision makers’ cognitive processes, but that
privileged metacognitive insights can drastically improve accuracy. Implications and
future directions are discussed.
knowledge about how they make decisions. Extant theory suggests that metacognitive
judgments can be informed by privileged, internal metacognitive insights (e.g.,
mnemonic cues, introspection), as well as observable, external information (e.g.,
extrinsic cues, intrinsic cues) that can be evaluated via non-privileged mechanisms,
such as statistical monitoring and top-down knowledge. Across two studies, we explore
the extent to which decision makers’ metacognitive knowledge of how they make
decisions is reliant on each of these sources. In Study 1, we demonstrate that decision
makers (n = 221) can more accurately estimate the weights they applied to each
attribute in a multi-attribute choice task than observers (n = 220) who studied their
choices. This contrast highlights the metacognitive value of privileged metacognitive
insights. However, observers’ estimates were still somewhat correlated with decision
makers’ true attribute weights, suggesting that the combination of statistical monitoring
and top-down knowledge can lead to reasonably accurate inferences, even without
access to privileged metacognitive insights. In Study 2, we demonstrate that observers’
(n = 218) inferences are only slightly less accurate when the context of the decision is
obscured, suggesting that top-down knowledge is not necessary for observers.
Together, these results suggest that statistical monitoring alone can generate
reasonably accurate inferences about decision makers’ cognitive processes, but that
privileged metacognitive insights can drastically improve accuracy. Implications and
future directions are discussed.